| Editor's Foreword | | xi | |
| Preface | | xv | |
| PART I Fundamental Ideas | | 1 | (38) |
| Four Roles of Political Philosophy | | | 1 | (4) |
| Society as a Fair System of Cooperation | | | 5 | (3) |
| The Idea of a Well-Ordered Society | | | 8 | (2) |
| The Idea of the Basic Structure | | | 10 | (2) |
| | | 12 | (2) |
| The Idea of the Original Position | | | 14 | (4) |
| The Idea of Free and Equal Persons | | | 18 | (6) |
| Relations between the Fundamental Ideas | | | 24 | (2) |
| The Idea of Public Justification | | | 26 | (3) |
| The Idea of Reflective Equilibrium | | | 29 | (3) |
| The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus | | | 32 | (7) |
| PART II Principles of Justice | | 39 | (41) |
| | | 39 | (3) |
| Two Principles of Justice | | | 42 | (8) |
| The Problem of Distributive Justice | | | 50 | (2) |
| The Basic Structure as Subject: First Kind of Reason | | | 52 | (3) |
| The Basic Structure as Subject: Second Kind of Reason | | | 55 | (2) |
| Who Are the Least Advantaged? | | | 57 | (4) |
| The Difference Principle: Its Meaning | | | 61 | (5) |
| Objections via Counterexamples | | | 66 | (6) |
| Legitimate Expectations, Entitlement, and Desert | | | 72 | (2) |
| On Viewing Native Endowments as a Common Asset | | | 74 | (3) |
| Summary Comments on Distributive Justice and Desert | | | 77 | (3) |
| PART III The Argument from the Original Position | | 80 | (55) |
| The Original Position: The Set-Up | | | 80 | (4) |
| The Circumstances of Justice | | | 84 | (1) |
| Formal Constraints and the Veil of Ignorance | | | 85 | (4) |
| The Idea of Public Reason | | | 89 | (5) |
| First Fundamental Comparison | | | 94 | (3) |
| The Structure of the Argument and the Maximin Rule | | | 97 | (4) |
| The Argument Stressing the Third Condition | | | 101 | (3) |
| The Priority of the Basic Liberties | | | 104 | (2) |
| An Objection about Aversion to Uncertainty | | | 106 | (5) |
| The Equal Basic Liberties Revisited | | | 111 | (4) |
| The Argument Stressing the Second Condition | | | 115 | (4) |
| Second Fundamental Comparison: Introduction | | | 119 | (1) |
| Grounds Falling under Publicity | | | 120 | (2) |
| Grounds Falling under Reciprocity | | | 122 | (2) |
| Grounds Falling under Stability | | | 124 | (2) |
| Grounds against the Principle of Restricted Utility | | | 126 | (4) |
| | | 130 | (2) |
| | | 132 | (3) |
| PART IV Institutions of a Just Basic Structure | | 135 | (45) |
| Property-Owning Democracy: Introductory Remarks | | | 135 | (3) |
| Some Basic Contrasts between Regimes | | | 138 | (2) |
| Ideas of the Good in Justice as Fairness | | | 140 | (5) |
| Constitutional versus Procedural Democracy | | | 145 | (3) |
| The Fair Value of the Equal Political Liberties | | | 148 | (2) |
| Denial of the Fair Value for Other Basic Liberties | | | 150 | (3) |
| Political and Comprehensive Liberalism: A Contrast | | | 153 | (4) |
| A Note on Head Taxes and the Priority of Liberty | | | 157 | (1) |
| Economic Institutions of a Property-Owning Democracy | | | 158 | (4) |
| The Family as a Basic Institution | | | 162 | (6) |
| The Flexibility of an Index of Primary Goods | | | 168 | (8) |
| Addressing Marx's Critique of Liberalism | | | 176 | (3) |
| Brief Comments on Leisure Time | | | 179 | (1) |
| PART V The Question of Stability | | 180 | (23) |
| The Domain of the Political | | | 180 | (4) |
| The Question of Stability | | | 184 | (4) |
| Is Justice as Fairness Political in the Wrong Way? | | | 188 | (1) |
| How Is Political Liberalism Possible? | | | 189 | (3) |
| An Overlapping Consensus Not Utopian | | | 192 | (3) |
| A Reasonable Moral Psychology | | | 195 | (3) |
| The Good of Political Society | | | 198 | (5) |
| Index | | 203 | |
