When it comes to markets, the first deadly sin is greed. Michael Lewis is our jungle guide through five of the most violent and costly upheavals in recent financial history: the crash of '87, the Russian default (and the subsequent collapse of Long-Term Capital Management), the Asian currency crisis of 1999, the Internet bubble, and the current sub-prime mortgage disaster.Read more...
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When it comes to markets, the first deadly sin is greed. Michael Lewis is our jungle guide through five of the most violent and costly upheavals in recent financial history: the crash of '87, the Russian default (and the subsequent collapse of Long-Term Capital Management), the Asian currency crisis of 1999, the Internet bubble, and the current sub-prime mortgage disaster. With his trademark humor and brilliant anecdotes, Lewis paints the mood and market factors leading up to each event, weaves contemporary accounts to show what people thought was happening at the time, and then, with the luxury of hindsight, analyzes what actually happened and what we should have learned from experience.
As he proved in Liar's Poker, The New New Thing, and Moneyball, Lewis is without peer in his understanding of market forces and human foibles. He is also, arguably, the funniest serious writer in America.
Publishers Weekly® Reviews
- Reviewed in: Publishers Weekly, page 53.
- Review Date: 2008-11-17
- Reviewer: Staff
Lewis (Liar’s Poker) takes readers on a spin through notable recent financial catastrophes including the stock market’s 1987 crash, the Russian default and related failure of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, the Asian currency crisis, the Internet bust and the recent subprime debacle. While the collection is comprehensive and contains varied and learned commentary, the presented crises beg for more thorough treatment. Lewis is content to rehash the past with (undeniably compelling) previously published analysis by the likes of economists Joseph Stieglitz and Paul Krugman and Wall Street Journal reporters Gregory Zuckerman and Roger Lowenstein. The author wisely includes excerpts from his books and articles, including an account of his time as a trader at Salomon Brothers in the midst of the junk bond crash of 1987 and his observations on the Internet boom and bust. The narrative is certainly elegant and the arguments are on-target; the author lambastes shoddy risk management at financial firms, the “foolish principles that have guided the behavior of sophisticated Wall Street traders” and the common man in this current crisis, and the problems caused “by the new complexities of the financial markets,” but readers seeking serious solutions to our current woes will be disappointed. (Jan.)
Michael Lewis follows the money
Be very wary when you start reading a flood of stories in the papers about how ordinary folks are getting rich because all the fusty old economic rules no longer apply. A few months before the Black Monday crash of Oct. 19, 1987, Time reported on the rise of the individual stock investor. In 1996, the New York Times had a story on how all the smart money was flooding into Asianot long before the Asian currency collapse. That same paper had already told us in 1995 about how easy it was becoming for technology companies to go public even if they weren't profitable. Hence the dotcom bust a few years later. And just before the subprime mortgage meltdownwell, you remember that one.
All those accurate-at-the-time stories have a home in Michael Lewis' timely anthology, Panic: The Story of Modern Financial Insanity, a readable guide to how we got into our current mess. For our rueful edification, Lewis collects and explains contemporary accounts of the four most recent panics, in 1987, 1997-1998, 2000-2001 and the one we're in now.
The writers range from economist/columnist Paul Krugman (already gloomy in 1998) to humorist Dave Barry (boy, was he right about the real estate insanity). It's easy to make fun of the optimists in retrospect, but there were also plenty of warnings in each case. John Cassidy predicted the mortgage meltdown in the New Yorker as long ago as 2002.
Lewis' own writings are among the best, both at the time and in the introductory chapters to the anthology's sections. He calls our era the "Age of Financial Unreason," when traders take complex risks they fail to understand, are briefly apologeticthen go right back to doing the same thing in some slightly different arena, still disconnected to the human misery they can cause. The difference now, Lewis points out, is the sheer scale of the catastrophe. No true reforms took place after the first three panics considered in this book. Maybe the time has come.
Anne Bartlett is a journalist in Washington, D.C.