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Veto Bargaining : Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power
by Charles Cameron and Randall Calvert and Thrainn Eggertsson




Overview -
With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining is a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.

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More About Veto Bargaining by Charles Cameron; Randall Calvert; Thrainn Eggertsson

 
 
 

Overview

With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining is a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.


This item is Non-Returnable.

 

Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780521625500
  • ISBN-10: 0521625505
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press
  • Publish Date: July 2000
  • Page Count: 312
  • Dimensions: 8.9 x 5.9 x 0.8 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 1.05 pounds

Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

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