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{ "item_title" : "Blinding the Enemy", "item_author" : [" Jerry R. Bolzak "], "item_description" : "This monograph examines Soviet tactical reconnaissance doctrine, organizations, and capability. The Soviet capability is analyzed using their own criteria for the conduct of tactical reconnaissance operations: purposefulness, aggressiveness, continuity, timeliness, and reliability. Soviet and Warsaw Pact Army documents (in translation) are used extensively. A recent Combined Arms Center study concluded that the U.S. Army's counterreconnaissance doctrine, force structure, and training are deficient. Beginning with this assertion, the monograph briefly explores the historical and current relationship between effective tactical reconnaissance and success on the battlefield. Then a detailed analysis of the Soviet reconnaissance capability determines that, despite difficulties in executing their doctrine, the Soviets possess a significant capability for seeing through the depth of the modern battlefield. The monograph stresses the correlation between the Soviet reconnaissance effort and their doctrine of developing operations into the tactical and operational depth of the battlefield. Consequently, Soviet reconnaissance patrols will operate in American rear areas. The monograph concludes with the suggestion that the U.S. Army should place greater emphasis on counter reconnaissance in its own rear areas -- in effect, blinding the enemy.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.", "item_img_path" : "https://covers3.booksamillion.com/covers/bam/1/24/988/220/1249882206_b.jpg", "price_data" : { "retail_price" : "15.95", "online_price" : "15.95", "our_price" : "15.95", "club_price" : "15.95", "savings_pct" : "0", "savings_amt" : "0.00", "club_savings_pct" : "0", "club_savings_amt" : "0.00", "discount_pct" : "10", "store_price" : "" } }
Blinding the Enemy|Jerry R. Bolzak

Blinding the Enemy : Soviet Tactical Reconnaissance in the Rear Area

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Overview

This monograph examines Soviet tactical reconnaissance doctrine, organizations, and capability. The Soviet capability is analyzed using their own criteria for the conduct of tactical reconnaissance operations: purposefulness, aggressiveness, continuity, timeliness, and reliability. Soviet and Warsaw Pact Army documents (in translation) are used extensively. A recent Combined Arms Center study concluded that the U.S. Army's counterreconnaissance doctrine, force structure, and training are deficient. Beginning with this assertion, the monograph briefly explores the historical and current relationship between effective tactical reconnaissance and success on the battlefield. Then a detailed analysis of the Soviet reconnaissance capability determines that, despite difficulties in executing their doctrine, the Soviets possess a significant capability for "seeing" through the depth of the modern battlefield. The monograph stresses the correlation between the Soviet reconnaissance effort and their doctrine of developing operations into the tactical and operational depth of the battlefield. Consequently, Soviet reconnaissance patrols will operate in American rear areas. The monograph concludes with the suggestion that the U.S. Army should place greater emphasis on counter reconnaissance in its own rear areas -- in effect, blinding the enemy.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.

This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.

As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

This item is Non-Returnable

Details

  • ISBN-13: 9781249882206
  • ISBN-10: 1249882206
  • Publisher: Biblioscholar
  • Publish Date: October 2012
  • Dimensions: 9.21 x 6.14 x 0.15 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 0.25 pounds
  • Page Count: 72

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