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Deterrence in the 2nd Nuclear..-Pa|Keith B. Payne

Deterrence in the 2nd Nuclear..-Pa

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Overview

The fundamental problem with the deterrence theory is that it posits a rationale--hence predictable--opponent. History frequently demonstrates the opposite. Payne argues that as the one remaining superpower, the United States needs to be more flexible in its approaches to regional powers.

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Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780813108957
  • ISBN-10: 0813108950
  • Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
  • Publish Date: October 1996
  • Dimensions: 8.94 x 6.01 x 0.48 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 0.65 pounds
  • Page Count: 184

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