{ "item_title" : "On the Economic Modeling of Corruption", "item_author" : [" Manuel Mahler-Hutter "], "item_description" : "This work discusses the economic literature on Corruption. I draw the distinction between market- and parochial corruption. The institutions and the corrupt contract are the base of the following analysis. Corruption happens within a Principal-Agent relationship. Corruption may flourish if economic rents exist, the costs of corruption are low or if the agents have large discretionary power. I discuss whether corruption always has to have negative influence on economic efficency. The empirical part analysis the influence of certain determinantson the CPI. The main findings are: - Corruption can be reduced by increasing the availability of means of communication to a large part of the citizens. - Higher political interest may lead to less corruption due to increased sensitivity towards authority's actions. - Direct regulations of the freedom of trade or entry to business increase the level of corruption; or the level of corruption decreases the ease of trading and doing business.", "item_img_path" : "https://covers1.booksamillion.com/covers/bam/1/44/668/753/1446687538_b.jpg", "price_data" : { "retail_price" : "34.20", "online_price" : "34.20", "our_price" : "34.20", "club_price" : "34.20", "savings_pct" : "0", "savings_amt" : "0.00", "club_savings_pct" : "0", "club_savings_amt" : "0.00", "discount_pct" : "10", "store_price" : "" } }

Overview

Customers Also Bought

Details