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{ "item_title" : "The Elm and the Expert", "item_author" : [" Jerry A. Fodor "], "item_description" : "The Elm and the Expert provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege's problem, twin cases, and the putative indeterminacy of reference. The book extends and revises a view of the relation between mind and meaning that the author has been developing since his 1975 book, The Language of Thought. Among philosophers, a general consensus exists that a referential semantics for mental representation cannot support a robust account of intentional explanation. This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus. Fodor offers a theory sketch in which psychological explanation is intentional, psychological processes are computational, and the semantic properties of mental representations are referential.", "item_img_path" : "https://covers4.booksamillion.com/covers/bam/0/26/256/093/0262560933_b.jpg", "price_data" : { "retail_price" : "30.00", "online_price" : "30.00", "our_price" : "30.00", "club_price" : "30.00", "savings_pct" : "0", "savings_amt" : "0.00", "club_savings_pct" : "0", "club_savings_amt" : "0.00", "discount_pct" : "10", "store_price" : "" } }
The Elm and the Expert|Jerry A. Fodor

The Elm and the Expert : Mentalese and Its Semantics

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Overview

The Elm and the Expert provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege's problem, twin cases, and the putative indeterminacy of reference. The book extends and revises a view of the relation between mind and meaning that the author has been developing since his 1975 book, The Language of Thought. Among philosophers, a general consensus exists that a referential semantics for mental representation cannot support a robust account of intentional explanation. This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus. Fodor offers a theory sketch in which psychological explanation is intentional, psychological processes are computational, and the semantic properties of mental representations are referential.

This item is Non-Returnable

Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780262560931
  • ISBN-10: 0262560933
  • Publisher: MIT Press
  • Publish Date: August 1995
  • Dimensions: 7.95 x 5.27 x 0.43 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 0.42 pounds
  • Page Count: 144
  • Reading Level: Ages 18-UP

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